CLIC PAPERS

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
FOR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

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CLIC PAPERS

CLIC PAPERS is an informal, occasional publication sponsored by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. They are dedicated to the advancement of the art and science of the application of the military instrument of national power in the low intensity conflict environment. All military members and civilian Defense Department employees are invited to contribute original, unclassified manuscripts for publication as CLIC PAPERS. Topics can include any aspect of military involvement in low intensity conflict to include history, doctrine, strategy, or operations. Papers should be as brief and concise as possible. Interested authors should submit double-spaced typed manuscripts along with a brief, one-page abstract of the paper to Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, VA 23665.

PREFACE

This paper was prepared in an attempt to provide a framework to consider the military role in low intensity conflict. Although written from an Army and Air Force perspective, it can be adapted to all services, departments, and agencies of the US Government. The paper explains the meaning of low intensity conflict, delineates its parameters, and describes its major components.

The starting point for this paper was US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-44, US Army Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict, dated 10 February 1986. However, during the writing, editing, and staffing, the authors attempted to include the essence of the various schools of thought concerning the scope and execution of low intensity conflict operations. This volatile and often controversial subject has and will continue to provoke debate and significant disagreements concerning the military role in low intensity conflict.

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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

FOR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

1. **Definition.**

    a.   Low intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives.   It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency.   Low intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. Also called LIC. (Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved)

    b.   In an expanded definition, LIC can be considered a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups within a state below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states or groups.   It may involve a protracted struggle of competing principles and ideologies and is waged with a combination of   political, economic, psychological, social, media, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and   global   security implications.   Low intensity conflict involves the actual or threatened use of force ranging from coercion and blackmail to armed violence.   The US military provides Third World assistance in the form of training, equipment, and combat support. The US may provide forces engaged in operations short of sustained combat.   Although US employment of nuclear forces is outside the scope of LIC, terrorist or insurgent employment of nuclear devices is a possibility in LIC.

2. **General.**

    a.   Low intensity conflict concerns the US primarily when it challenges US national interests.   A strategic consequence of unchecked LIC could be the isolation of the US from its allies and global trading partners and thereby a weakening of the political and economic institutions of the free world.   The response to this form of warfare requires long-term commitment.

    b.   The difference between military operations in LIC and mid- or high-intensity conventional war is in the objective.   In the latter,   success is measured in terms of winning battles and campaigns. In LIC, success will consist of achieving US national security objectives that cannot be met with the use of military power alone.   A comprehensive strategy incorporating political, economic,   social,   psychological,   and military programs and initiatives is paramount.

c. The fundamentals, principles, tenets, tasks, roles, and missions discussed in FM 100-5, <u>Operations</u>, and AFM 1-1, <u>Basic Aerospace Doctrine</u>, are valid in and applicable to the LIC environment. However, the complexities of civil-military activities in LIC require flexible and imaginative adaptations to each situation.

d. The US armed forces' mission in LIC falls into four general categories: peacekeeping, insurgency/counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, and peacetime contingency operations. These general categories are not mutually exclusive and often overlap. For example, peacekeeping forces should take antiterrorist precautions to protect the force, and a contingency operation may be executed as a result of a terrorist incident.

e. Special Considerations.

(1) Efforts to distinguish LIC from other levels of warfare often point to the predominance of the political over the military component. With no clear distinction between peace and war, the idea that war suspends politics gives way to the thesis that war has a definite political focus. Political constraints dictate that commanders and decision-makers possess the capability to translate broad strategic guidance into definitive operational objectives. Such a capability permits the development of clearly-defined criteria for employment of military power. This is true in either an indirect role, such as support to security assistance, or a direct role, as when US forces are engaged in combat. Direct employment of US combat forces is a last resort when vital national interests cannot otherwise be adequately protected. For direct employment, initial planning should include a timetable for force withdrawal. However, the task of assisting friends and allies to help themselves is a long-term effort with few timetables. We must be prepared to transcend political change both at home and within the host country.

(a) While the basic Service principles and tenets are valid in LIC, how a commander applies them can be, and often is, very different from conventional application. Additionally, the commander may have to consider altogether different factors when engaged in LIC. For example, commanders in conventional conflict have traditionally relied on a correlation of forces, firepower, and conventional tactics to win battles. Low intensity conflict operations require that a commander exercise self-restraint in the use of firepower and have the ability to operate within complex political constraints.

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(b) Traditionally, a commander considers mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) as he makes an estimate of the situation. While these considerations also apply in LIC, the focus or method of application may vary from traditional combat. Low intensity conflict requires commanders to also recognize the unique aspects of intelligence preparation of the battlefield, political/military objectives, phased doctrine, and tailored forces in the LIC environment.

(2) Joint, Combined, and Interagency Operations. It is unlikely that a commander will commit forces from a single service in a LIC environment. A commander should establish a clearly understood chain of command to ensure, among other things, unity of effort and economy of force.

(3) United States Army/Air Force Roles. The specific mission determines what forces a commander needs. In most cases, security assistance personnel, special operations forces, and elements of combat support and combat service support units will play a major role in LIC. United States combat forces should be used only when and where they have a high probability of decisively altering the overall situation.

(4) Intelligence. Successful LIC operations depend upon timely, specific, and accurate all-source intelligence. Forces involved in LIC operations need immediate access to detailed information including economic, political, cultural, geographic, and law enforcement data. Only persons completely familiar with the local situation and able to place events in proper context should interpret intelligence. The intelligence process should be continuous, aggressive, and responsive to current and projected LIC threats. Agreements and understandings with other governments and agencies should exist to allow for immediate access to current and detailed information.

(5) Psychological Operations. In LIC, psychological operations (PSYOP) are not merely supporting measures or propaganda efforts. They are principal ingredients of successful campaigns. Both military and nonmilitary actions should be considered in terms of psychological impact. This may require that operations be conducted primarily for their psychological impact and that short-range tactical advantages be sacrificed to preserve long-range objectives. The proper employment of PSYOP may actually preclude the necessity for commitment of combat forces in some LIC activities.

(6) Public Affairs. The images the media present significantly influence public opinion. Adversaries are often quite adept at manipulating the media to alter world or domestic opinion. Low intensity conflict operations, because they are strongly political, also have an increased impact because of the

immediacy of contemporary media reporting. The near-real-time transmission and broadcast of events can readily focus and influence world or domestic public attention on a specific issue. At the same time, it can provide a source of intelligence for belligerents. However, public affairs can attract popular support and bolster a host nation's government while at the same time blunting or reversing collusion with insurgent elements.

       (7) Logistics. In LIC, logistics elements may precede other forces into the area of operations or may be the only military forces deployed. Logistics preparation of the battlefield as a specific task or as a collateral benefit of assistance to a host nation can be critical to the successful prosecution of a current or future LIC operation. Within the political constraints governing US involvement, logistics systems must have the flexibility to tailor support to the local situation. Logistics support in LIC involves not only providing materiel and supplies to US and host nation combat forces but also working to develop host nation logistics systems.

3. **Threat Assessment/Environment.**

    a. Low intensity conflict is not new. Throughout history, groups have sought to achieve their goals through the use of various elements of power, including military actions. Declaring embargoes, setting up blockades, staging demonstrations of military capabilities, inciting and supporting insurgents, creating harassment at borders, carrying out incursions, and resorting to intimidation have long been a part of international affairs. Conflict usually remains at the low intensity level when the resources of at least one of the belligerents are limited or when both parties desire to avoid either the greater cost or greater risk of a more intense effort.

    b. Ideological Confrontation.

       (1) The divergent interests of the US and the Soviet Union often heighten the significance of what otherwise would be local conflicts or power shifts. Nuclear parity at the strategic level and the threat of escalation to nuclear confrontation tend to place LICs within Third World countries. Examples of limited struggles include conflicts in Afghanistan and Vietnam and support for third parties against clients of the other, e.g., Soviet support to the Palestine Liberation Organization and US support to Afghan freedom fighters.

       (2) While the Soviets are not responsible for all conflict in the world, they are adept at exploiting an otherwise indigenous conflict. Soviet client states perpetuate this form of warfare throughout the noncommunist world. The result has been an increased availability of advanced arms and training to countries and groups willing to use force to obtain their goals.

c. Lesser Developed and Developed Nations.

(1) Lesser developed nations are susceptible to internal strife resulting from limited resources, lack of effective control, unfulfilled expectations, ineffective domestic policies, and poorly defined national goals. Conflicting claims between lesser developed nations as well as internal conflict between tribes, ethnic groups, or political factions are common.

(2) In developed nations, terrorism and other forms of political violence are more often aimed at influencing national will, making world headlines, coercing a government, or achieving other goals short of actual overthrow. Low intensity conflict between developed nations can include socioeconomic actions designed to cripple the economy or cause embarrassment.

d. Technological Advances.

(1) Technological advances have impacted on the entire spectrum of conflict. However, they have impacted nowhere else as dramatically as they have in LIC where the vulnerability of developed societies has increased at the same time that more advanced weapons are available to potential enemies. The increasing dependence upon support facilities such as water, power, sewage, ports, telecommunication, and automation centers has made such facilities extremely vulnerable and lucrative targets. Modern weapons allow a small group of insurgents or terrorists to threaten the vital services of urban communities.

(2) Technology has increased the range, accuracy, firepower, and lethality of many weapons, giving a relatively unsophisticated opponent the capability of inflicting great damage. It has also facilitated command and control at all levels. Near-real-time intelligence available to both superpowers improves the capability of some belligerents to determine the capabilities and intentions of an adversary. The same technology enhances the ability to threaten and/or deceive.

(3) The development of small nuclear devices and the potential for terrorist use of biological and chemical weapons can be significant problems in LIC. Even the threat of using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by a state or group could increase the potential leverage of that state or group.

e. Supranational Organizations.

(1) Large supranational organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization of American States, or the World Bank, are a part of a complex series of worldwide interrelationships. These organizations wield considerable power in economic terms and, in some cases, military terms (e.g., UN

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peacekeeping forces). Multinational corporations also have enormous influence domestically and internationally. Increasingly, they have become targets for terrorists and insurgent forces. In some cases, for protective reasons, multinational corporations have developed special relationships with local governments or other political forces. Some even have employed their own independent intelligence and security forces.

(2) Transnational, cultural, linguistic, and religious populations provide another level of complexity. Allegiances and sympathies can transcend political boundaries. Although their goals and geographic locations may be different, many terrorist and insurgent organizations mutually support each other by sharing funds, expertise, training, equipment, and sanctuaries. These groups often engage in such activities as drug sales and kidnaping to obtain resources for their operations.

4. Organizations and Responsibilities.

a. Commanders should understand the political ramifications of military operations and the level of complexity most actions within LIC entail. For this reason, it is important to review key components and their responsibilities.

b. Under the Constitution, the President is responsible for developing and executing US foreign policy. However, he does not perform this duty in isolation. Congress becomes involved in foreign policy through the approval of funding and commitment of US forces abroad and through security assistance legislation. The War Powers Act places specific limitations on the commitment of US forces. Also, the National Security Council advises the President on all national security matters and foreign policy issues. This broad policy guidance flows from the President to the various departments and agencies charged with carrying out the national strategy.

c. The President's representative in supervising, directing, and coordinating US foreign policy is the Secretary of State. The President's representative in each country is normally the US ambassador who has full responsibility for directing and coordinating the activities of all elements of the US diplomatic mission.

d. The US diplomatic mission to a host nation includes the representatives of all in-country US Government departments and agencies under the direction and control of the ambassador who exercises interagency authority by direction of the President with three exceptions: (1) another Mission, (2) international agencies (e.g., the UN), and (3) Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). Principal military members of the Mission are the Defense Attache (DATT) and the Chief of the Security Assistance

Organization (SAO). The various representatives of all agencies and departments meet periodically with the ambassador for interagency coordination and together constitute the country team. Because of political-military implications, military activities under control of the CINC must be coordinated through the country team to ensure continuity of effort and eliminate counterproductive initiatives. Unlike the SAO Chief, or the DATT, the senior US military force commander in country is not a member of the diplomatic mission. However, he should be invited to participate in embassy meetings.

e. The role of the CINC is critical in LIC situations. He is responsible for advising the JCS on significant events in his area of responsibility. His perspective is regional and oriented to the operational level of conflict. He should identify and, when directed, apply the necessary resources required to achieve US national strategic goals. The theater CINC has the responsibility and authority to communicate with the chiefs of the military Services, the JCS, and the Secretary of Defense on all military-related matters. For needed coordination with ambassadors in his area of operation, the theater CINC appoints a contact officer to represent his interests in country with both the country team and host nation military forces. Additionally, the theater CINC has a Department of State advisor as a member of his command staff.

f. The SAO manages Department of Defense (DoD) security assistance functions in a foreign country. Although the Chief of the SAO reports to the theater CINC, he is also a member of the country team and thus serves under the direction and control of the ambassador. The theater CINC normally appoints the SAO chief as his contact officer. In certain countries where the US has not established a SAO, security assistance management responsibilities may be assigned to another member of the mission, e.g., the DATT or the political officer.

g. The JCS assist the Secretary of Defense by approving joint plans which provide guidance to unified commands. Additionally, the JCS fully coordinate any program recommendations coming from the SAO and unified commands to ensure consistency with US global security plans.

5. **Category I -- Peacekeeping.**

    a. **Definition.** Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict.

    b. **Environment.**

    (1) Increasing world tensions, continuing conflicts, diminishing resources, and burgeoning feelings of general distrust create situations which may warrant the deployment of military forces in support of diplomatic efforts to maintain peace. A peacekeeping mission may present ambiguous situations that require forces to deal with extreme tension and violence in the forms of terrorism, sabotage, and military conflicts from both known and unknown belligerents.

    (2) Peacekeeping operations take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement concerning the size and type of forces each participating nation will contribute. The participants will conduct these operations in accordance with agreements between the parties in conflict. United States participation may include military units or may involve only individuals acting as observers.

    c. **Operational Considerations.**

    (1) While each PKO is unique, all PKO have a common element: constraint in the use of force. Normally, there are two missions in peacekeeping operations: supervising cease-fires, and restoring and/or maintaining law and order.

    (2) The US trains its forces to engage, defeat, and destroy hostile forces. Peacekeeping operations rest on the premise that peacekeeping units should use force only for self defense. Consequently, while the US equips, trains, and motivates its forces to fight, these forces should also be prepared to perform the nonviolent role of peacekeeper.

    (3) Peacekeeping operations may require a commander to position units in hostile environments. To be effective, the peacekeeping force and its support units must establish themselves as truly impartial entities. The commander should be sensitive to the impartial status of a peacekeeping force and be prepared to withdraw the force should the situation deteriorate and the maintenance of total impartiality become jeopardized. The commander should be cognizant of changing events that may require an increased commitment, and he should make plans to reduce the vulnerability of peacekeeping forces to hostile elements. Such planning may entail special applications of

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aerial observation platforms, human intelligence, and networks of ground sensors. The planning should take into account the available resources from other US Services, allies, and friends and should include provisions for rapid relocation of peacekeeping forces.

6. **Category II -- Insurgency/Counterinsurgency.**

    a. **Definitions.**

        (1) Insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JCS PUB 1)

        (2) Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency. (JCS PUB 1)

    b. **Environment.**

        (1) The problems of nation building in Third World states emerging from colonial rule have led to political, social, and economic instabilities. These instabilities often threaten the survival of legitimate governments and may threaten to compromise US security interests. These instabilities also exist in some of the older, independent nations of the Third World. Generally, these instabilities spawn popular dissatisfaction and highlight a struggling government's inability to respond effectively to national needs. These instabilities constitute areas ripe for exploitation by internal elements who seek to implement through violent acts what they cannot effect through peaceful means. Frequently in these instances, the Soviet Union and its surrogates capitalize on these misfortunes and support the insurgents in their attempts to overthrow the existing order. In other instances, insurgents secure support by promising freedom from repression, and then once the insurgents take power they impose far more repressive governments. Castro's Cuba and Pol Pot's Cambodia are good examples.

        (2) Insurgents adopt various methods to achieve their objectives. Normally, these methods, whether appearing alone or in combination, pass through phases that evolve from the organization of the movement to the overthrow of a government. A direct connection between the insurgent and social grievances may not exist. The linkage between the insurgent and social grievances can be, and often is, a linkage of political expediency, which the insurgent tries to make real. However, this expedient aspect should not obscure the fact that real social grievances do exist. Instability also may stem from a perception by segments of the population that the established government is either unwilling or unable to resolve issues of

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injustices.   These issues are usually economic but may   include
political,   military,   police,   social,   and   religious   issues.
Initially,   the   government may not recognize the depth of unrest
or the potential for political violence.   Moreover, there may be
instances where the government recognizes the problem but chooses
to ignore it until armed violence has to be met with armed force.

    c.   Operational Considerations.

      (1)   The most prevalent form of US involvement   in   this
area has been assisting friendly governments threatened by
externally   supported   insurgents   to   alleviate   the   legitimate
grievances of their populations.   The US is also helping the
governments combat insurgent groups whose aim is not reform but
the seizing of power.   Since the root problems of insurgency are
usually   political,   social,   and   economic,   assisting the host
country   combat   the   military threat is but   one   element   in   a
comprehensive strategy that must address the conflict's multiple
dimensions.   The key to success in this kind of war is the   host
country's   willingness   to   make sufficient improvements   in   the
society to preempt the insurgents' cause.

      (2)   Insurgencies are typically protracted conflicts and
therefore require a strategy suitable for the long haul.   Such a
strategy is not so much one to help these nations win battles
against   insurgent   military   forces   as it is   to   assist their
military to gain the time necessary for needed reforms to take
root and flourish.   Unless the host government succeeds in
eliminating the underlying causes of insurgency, any military
successes in the field will prove fleeting.

      (3)   Counterinsurgency   is   more   a   political   and
psychological struggle than a military contest.   It is indeed a
battle to "win the hearts and minds" of the people.   The lead
agency in countering insurgencies is the host nation government.
The military should support the government's political, economic,
and   social   programs.   The   pivotal   element   in   a   successful
counterinsurgency   strategy   is   the   host   government's   early
intervention when the insurgency is still basically a political
and psychological struggle.

      (a)   To   be   effective,   commanders   involved   in   a
counterinsurgency   should   be   aware   of   the   nature   of   the
insurgency.   They must recognize the particular phase at which
they first encounter or recognize the insurgency, stop it in that
phase, and attempt to push it back through the previous phases.
At the same time, they must also address the factors that spawned
the conflict.

(b)   In combatting insurgencies, US forces operate
in concert with both host nation forces and other US Government
agencies, normally through the mechanism of the country team.
The US Government should help the host nation to develop a
comprehensive national strategic plan involving all elements of
the host nation's resources.   The plan should take into account
the following:

    o   unity of effort
    o   all-source intelligence
    o   minimum use of deadly force
    o   neutralization or isolation of the insurgents
    o   promotion of the legitimacy of the government

In support of the host nation strategic plan, US military
involvement falls into two broad areas: noncombat support and
application of US combat power.

(4)   In the early phase of an insurgency, US forces can
assume various noncombat support relationships with the host
nation's military forces.   They can serve as advisors or
instructors.   Certain special operations forces are specifically
trained and uniquely qualified for this mission.   Combat support
or combat service support units may augment the host nation's
effort and also create a framework that can enhance US
warfighting capabilities, if such employment should become
necessary. A crucial consideration in counterinsurgency strategy
is that US forces remain unobtrusive in their support role. This
helps maintain the credibility of the host government and bolster
its popular support.

(5)   Civil affairs operations, coordinated through the
country team and conducted by civil affairs, engineer, medical,
logistics, military and security police, and administrative
elements, can help restore stability, contribute to national
development, and promote support for the government.   Civil
affairs should reinforce psychological operations as an extension
of a coherent long-term effort to promote legitimacy of the
government. Continuous intelligence should be totally integrated
with the civil affairs effort to maximize its effect.

(6)   United States security assistance organizations,
mobile training teams, and special operations forces elements
should focus on ensuring the local military posture is credible
and adequate to meet potential threats and to avoid the need for
direct US combat intervention.   At all levels, US organizations
should take care to ensure all security assistance efforts remain
within the limits of US policy guidance, support the host nation
counterinsurgency strategy, and are suitable to the needs and
capabilities of a developing nation.   Such efforts should be
integrated with psychological and civil affairs operations.

(a)   In determining the air power aspects of security assistance, the responsible US organization should assess the threat and attempt to establish a balanced mix of capabilities within the host government. When US organizations select aerospace systems for Third World security assistance, they should give consideration to acquiring inexpensive, reliable, flexible, and simple-to-operate platforms that can provide mobility, surveillance and reconnaissance, close air support, and interdiction. Air power can give a host government access to remote, unimproved sites in all areas of their country.

(b)   For technical support in areas such as communication, logistics, and intelligence, US organizations should also consider the factors of cost, reliability, and simplicity in developing the host country's overall plan.

(7) While use of US combat forces in counterinsurgencies may become necessary, the US goal should be to avoid direct involvement in combat operations. The objective of committing US forces to combat should be to either effect a decisive change in the conflict, preserve US interests in serious jeopardy, or provide the time and space for local forces to regain the initiative and resume control of tactical operations. These forces will assist the host nation and concurrently conduct or support joint and combined operations against irregular guerrilla forces.   If the insurgency reaches a conventional warfare phase, US combat forces may also have to engage enemy main force units in a joint and combined effort to drive the insurgency back to the guerrilla warfare phase. Again, this strategy is aimed at holding the conflict at the lowest possible level of violence while the host government establishes the necessary national political, economic, social, and military programs.

(8)   The manner in which the US employs combat forces will vary with the situation. Because indigenous military forces are familiar with the local communities and the population, it is generally better to use them in the populated areas and to employ US combat assets in remote areas. The types of combat forces that the US may employ in counterinsurgencies include special operations and general purpose forces.

(a) Special Operations Forces. These forces can be used prior to, during, and after the introduction of general purpose forces. Their special skills , specialized equipment, and area orientation, coupled with their intelligence gathering, psychological operations, civil affairs, and language capabilities, make them ideally suited to counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, these forces have the unique capability to develop, organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces in the conduct of counterguerrilla warfare.

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(b) General Purpose Forces. Rapidly deployable, sustainable, and maintainable US forces may also be necessary in a counterinsurgency environment. These forces should be fully prepared to engage in small unit actions, to launch independent or coordinated air attacks, and to operate in austere conditions at extended distances from their main operating bases. Additionally, they should be capable of securing those assets vital to US interests. As in the host nation strategic plan, the US combat plan should emphasize unity of effort, maximum use of all-source intelligence, and minimum use of deadly force and violence.   Human intelligence, networks of ground sensors, sophisticated aerial observation and surveillance platforms (manned or remotely piloted), and long range reconnaissance patrols will be the critical elements in determining when and where to attack guerrilla forces.   Sound operations and communications security procedures, coupled with rapid air insertion of ground forces, will serve to maximize effectiveness. Use of precision guided munitions should reduce collateral damage to noncombatant property and personnel. This capability will be especially important if urban attack operations are required.

(9) United States forces involved in counterinsurgency operations should have an appreciation of the culture in which they are employed. Language capabilities are important and should be developed to the maximum extent possible. Prior to arrival in the host country, US units should be established as an effective, cohesive group, and be prepared to begin immediate operations.

(10) When US combat units are required for counterinsurgency operations, planning for their withdrawal should begin even before their deployment. The withdrawal of combat units depends on the capability of the host nation forces to regain and maintain control.

(11) While insurgencies and counterinsurgencies seem to possess similar features, they are different in important ways. Although dependent on the particular scenario, the phase of the conflict, and the theory of insurgency, the following factors may help to clarify these differences.

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FACTORS	INSURGENCY	COUNTERINSURGENCY
Goal	Seize Political Control	Retain Political Control
Economy	Disrupt	Maintain/Improve
C^3	Exploit	Improve
Permanent Territorial Control	Localized At First	Essential Throughout
Visibility	Low and Mysterious	High and Massive
Cost	Cheap initially	Expensive
Initial Power	Slight	Preponderant
Organize Equip and Train	Starts small from unconventional and builds up	Takes relatively large conventional forces & tailors to the situation

(12) All insurgencies will not fit a clearly established pattern. Some are highly charged by religious or ethnic divisions and rooted in long standing emotional issues. Some are motivated by objectives such as separatism, local autonomy, or economic issues. Although the US prefers to associate itself with peaceful and legitimate changes of power, insurgencies are not necessarily contrary to the best interests of the US and sometimes supporting an insurgency may be the best course for US national policy.

(a) United States support for insurgent activities is effective only within the broader context of a coordinated employment of national resources toward a clearly-defined, political objective. Usually such an objective means eliminating foreign military presence and curtailing the influx of arms from the outside. Insurgent activities can be an effective complement to diplomatic, economic, and political initiatives.

(b) The primary military forces suitable for support of insurgencies are special operations forces who have extensive training in unconventional warfare. Their tasks, overt or clandestine, include support and advice to indigenous resistance forces. Examples of operations in which US forces could assist are forming, organizing, and training guerrilla forces to perform interdiction, psychological operations, intelligence gathering, linkup operations, evasion and escape of combatants, subversion, and sabotage.

7. Category III -- Combatting Terrorism.

    a. **Definition.** Combatting terrorism consists of those defensive (antiterrorism) and offensive (counterterrorism) measures to meet the evolving terrorism threat. Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property for coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for achieving political, religious, or ideological objectives. (DoD Directive 2000.12)

    b. **Environment.**

        (1) Terrorists operate worldwide and pose an increasing threat to US interests. They may be sponsored by political or other groups within a nation, sponsored by an external source, or employed by insurgents as a means to an end. Terrorism is a dimension of conflict which potentially pays high dividends with minimal risk. Population areas, public transport, industrial facilities, and individuals are all terrorist targets. Terrorists tend to use means that do not conform to the rules of law or warfare.

        (2) The objectives of terrorists fall into four general categories. A terrorist organization may pursue one or more of these objectives in its strategy. A terrorist organization may establish its own objectives and strategy, or a government that is supporting or using the terrorists may establish the objectives and strategy.

            (a) Recognition. Those acts, usually conducted at the onset of a campaign, designed to attract high-level media coverage. Hijacking aircraft or kidnaping prominent people are examples of terrorists acts used to establish a terrorist organization as "bona fide."

            (b) Coercion. Those acts designed to make governments change their policy. Threats and announcements before bombings are examples of terrorists acts used to influence small groups or specific individuals within the government.

            (c) Provocation. Those acts targeted against representatives of the government, such as police and military personnel, designed to produce over reaction by the government.

            (d) Intimidation. Intimidation differs from coercion by attempting to prevent individuals or groups from acting in support of the government or against the terrorist. Assassination, bombings, arson, and kidnaping are tactics used to discourage cooperation between the population and its government.

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(3)   Terrorists' methods include, but are not limited to, hostage taking, piracy, sabotage, assassination, threats, hoaxes, bombings, shootings, or torture.   The victims of terrorism generally have no role in either causing or correcting the grievances of the terrorists.

   c.   Operational Considerations.

(1)   The DoD efforts in combatting terrorism are guided by a national policy that includes four major tenets. First, the US Government opposes terrorism and is prepared to respond to terrorist acts.   Second, the US Government will take measures to protect its citizens, property, and interests.   Third, the US Government will make no concessions to terrorists.   Fourth, the US Government will act against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles.

(2)   Antiterrorism consists of defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism.   (DoD Directive 2000.12) Antiterrorism is a program that encompasses security and law enforcement for facility defense;   reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence for threat warning;   and education and awareness training for individual personnel and property protection.

(3)   Counterterrorism consists of offensive measures taken for preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism. (DoD Directives 2000.12) Counterterrorism operations usually occur in response to a particular terrorist incident or series of incidents. Where rescue or recovery of personnel and/or property is involved, the specific details of the incident determine the agency responsible for both leading and supporting activities. The military Services support these activities by providing forces, communications, intelligence, and logistics capability as required.   The need for precision and surprise often dictates that the execution of these activities take the form of low-visibility, direct-action missions.

(4)   While general purpose forces may participate in rescue and recovery activities, the primary role of these forces is usually reactive or preventive operations against state-sponsored terrorist personnel and/or facilities.   For example, air attacks or interdiction missions are normally conducted to preempt a potentially hostile capability or as a punitive measure and, as such, have a high political impact. However, the total costs and benefits of each action must be weighed within the context of the overall political framework.

(5)   Terrorism is most effective when media coverage provides an audience beyond the scope of the immediate victims. The successful terrorist group understands how the media can

enhance the impact of its violent acts and so aid in the achievement of its political objectives. The responsible authorities pondering the utility of particular responses to terrorism must consider the repercussions of broad media coverage. In developing courses of action, these decision-makers must consider the legal, ethical, and political ramifications of the response. General guidelines for counterterrorism actions should emphasize responses proportionate to the terrorist act and which produce the least possible collateral damage.

(6) While an offensive strategy for combatting terrorism can demonstrate a nation's resolve, decision-makers have to recognize that counterterrorism actions constitute an irresistible subject for the media, are politically sensitive, and demand careful orchestration. Also decision-makers should understand that successful execution of an offensive strategy offers great psychological benefits against the terrorists. Psychological operations can be conducted in concert with an offensive strategy and thereby isolate the terrorists from their sources of support and even instigate rivalry between different terrorist organizations.

8. **Category IV -- Peacetime Contingency Operations.**

a. **Definition.** Peacetime contingency operations are politically sensitive military operations characterized by the short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of conventional war. Distinguishing characteristics of peacetime contingency operations include orientation on a specific center of gravity and the intention to deal with that center of gravity with a single stroke. These characteristics normally require:

- o tailored forces
- o short duration
- o joint/combined operations

b. **Environment.**

(1) Peacetime contingency operations become necessary when diplomatic initiatives are ineffective in achieving extremely time sensitive, high value objectives, or when unexpected threats to US interests require a rapid response. Diplomatic failure to influence an adversary may require the immediate use of military forces to protect national interests, rescue US citizens, or defend US assets. In this regard, the military becomes a more visible instrument of foreign policy. Peacetime contingency operations are feasible in either a friendly or hostile environment.

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(2)   Peacetime contingency operations have psychological effects in themselves since they specifically affect the attitudes and behavior of foreign audiences.   Attacks against terrorists' sanctuaries are good examples of strategic psychological operations.   They demonstrate US resolve in dealing with terrorists' actions.   A show of force to demonstrate US national strength and intention is another well recognized psychological activity.   Rescue and recovery operations also have high psychological impact.   They demonstrate to the world community the resolve of the US to protect its citizens.

   c.   Operational Considerations.

   (1)   Peacetime contingency operations can include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following areas:

   o   crisis intelligence operations
   o   humanitarian assistance
   o   noncombatant evacuation
   o   security assistance surges
   o   shows of force and demonstrations
   o   raids and attacks
   o   rescue and recovery operations
   o   support to US civil authorities

   (2)   Intelligence necessary to carry out peacetime contingency operations requires timely, all-source intelligence gathering.   Competing requirements for technically collected intelligence combined with the unique environment often existing in LIC require careful management.   Accurate information concerning the true nature of a crisis is crucial to making sound decisions regarding the commitment or noncommitment of forces. These operations can be part of an overall operation or can occur solely as an intelligence collection effort.

   (3)   Such natural disasters as floods and earthquakes place extreme hardships on affected nations and peoples.   In the LIC environment, they exacerbate an already unstable situation. When properly orchestrated, US participation in humanitarian assistance can have significant, positive effects.

   (4)   When US citizens face threats, US forces may have to evacuate noncombatants.   Under ideal circumstances, there would be little or no opposition to the evacuation, but commanders must anticipate the development of a hostile situation.   Planners should include careful coordination with the media in the evacuation plan both from the standpoints of enhancing security and disseminating positive information.

   (5)   The US can accelerate security assistance when a friendly or allied nation is under an imminent threat.   In such

an acceleration, operations usually focus on logistical support. The magnitude and time limitations of the logistical effort will determine airlift and sealift requirements. The US assistance to Israel in the Yom Kippur war of 1973 provides an example of accelerated delivery of security assistance in support of national objectives.

(6)   Shows of force and demonstrations are examples of committing national resources to intimidate an unfriendly nation or group into altering its actions or to enforce international law.   These operations are usually in support of a threatened allied or friendly nation.   A show of force or demonstration can involve simultaneous operations in widely separated areas and may be unilateral or in conjunction with allies.   Combined exercises as a show of force can be effective in strengthening regional security arrangements, improving interoperability, and practicing deployment.   They involve the overt marshaling of forces or resources for the purpose of influencing both friendly and enemy attitudes.   Soviet use of sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities, for example, makes it possible to portray US intent and resolve through such actions as the massing of forces at CONUS bases or staging force alerts.   A national resolve to employ the force should intimidation fail is critical to the successful execution of a show of force or demonstration.

(7)   Raids or attacks with air and/or ground forces are usually for a specific purpose other than gaining or holding terrain.   They are characterized by brief, violent action, coupled with rapid disengagement and swift withdrawal.   Normally conducted to preempt a potentially hostile capability or as a punitive measure, they have a high political impact.

(8)   Rescue and recovery operations are sophisticated activities requiring precise execution, especially when conducted in unfriendly countries.   These operations may be clandestine or overt.   Missions may include the rescue of US or other citizens and the location, identification, and recovery of sensitive equipment or items critical to US national security.   The execution of rescue and recovery operations can be either unopposed or opposed by hostile forces.   Speed and surprise are essential to mission success in either case.

(a)   Rescue and recovery operations are unopposed when the potentially hostile force is unaware of the situation or is unable or unwilling to interfere in the rescue or recovery. Stealth, speed, and the ability of the US to bring overwhelming force to bear may be sufficient to make the operation unopposed.

(b)   Opposed rescue and recovery operations require the actual or threatened local concentration of sufficient power to overcome hostile forces.   Opposed operations require timely

intelligence, detailed planning, deception, swift execution, and extraordinary security measures. Opposed rescue and recovery operations usually involve the use of highly-trained special units, but they may include general purpose forces.

(9) Support to US civil authority are those activities carried out by military forces in support of federal and state officials in accordance with, and limited by, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (as amended), Title 10 USC Chapter 18 (Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials), DoD Directive 5525.5, and other applicable laws and regulations. Congress and the courts have traditionally seen the situations requiring military support as very specific, and they have generally restricted military support to instances involving civil disorders, disaster assistance, threats to Federal property, and similar activities. In 1981, Congress defined drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and customs violations as threats to national security warranting military support and have included these activities under the Posse Comitatus Act. Military units should conduct operations in support of US civil authorities, and, in particular, in support of US civil drug laws as incidental to training activities and with means that do not detract from military readiness.

9. **Conclusion.**

a. The US determination to deter nuclear and conventional war has driven our adversaries to consciously turn to political violence to advance their political objectives. These actions, known as LIC, assault the national interests, values, and political foundations of the US, its friends, and its allies. The strategic consequences of the unchecked LIC threat present the danger that a series of reversals will gradually isolate the US and its allies from the Third World and from each other.

b. The challenges of dealing with LIC include the diversity of individual and collective threats, the uncertainty concerning appropriate roles and purposes, and the conflict of values and institutional interests. Such challenges are often heightened by misconceptions of whether we are at war or at peace.

c. Meeting these challenges is a difficult but achievable task. It requires an institutionalized understanding that moves away from thinking and acting in a manner appropriate to more traditional forms of conflict. Winning LICs requires a continuing, long-term, national strategy that provides a comprehensive plan for all US military and civilian agencies. Thus, maintaining readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict requires coping with the evolving conflict model for LIC as well as the traditional conflict model for sustained combat.